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tions to the jury, this result still does not answer the important
questions that arise in the area of former jeopardy. Perhaps the
General Assembly may see a need to revise our law of principals and
accessories, as numerous other legislatures have done. 0 A clarification is needed to remove the state of uncertainty that now exists.
WILLIAm R. HOKE
Evidence-Presumptions and Burden of Proof-Agency-Motor Vebiles-Identifying Markings
In 1947 the North Carolina Supreme Court in Carterv. Thruston
Motor Lines Inc.,' held that proof of identifying markings on a
commercial vehicle, taken in conjunction with adequate evidence of
negligent operation of the vehicle, was not sufficient to sustain the
necessary inferences of ownership, agency, and scope of employment 2
to make out a prima facie case of respondeat superior liability against
the party suggested by the markings as being the owner. A note
writer in this Review at that time3 suggested that the difficulties of
proof frequently confronting plaintiffs in respect of ownership,
agency, and scope, as illustrated in that case, might well justify
judicial adoption of a rule by which the master-servant relationship
and scope of employment would be inferred from proof of ownership.
The court did not do so, but the legislature in 1951 enacted such a
rule in G.S. § 20-71.1,' which contained the additional element of
inferring ownership from proof of registration.
Whatever the intention of the legislature, the language of this
statute, that proof of the basic facts of ownership or agency shall "be
prima facie evidence" of the inferred essential facts invoking vicarious
liability, has proved a somewhat illusory weapon for plaintiffs. Since
it is couched in the language of prima facie evidence, and not of
presumption, and since it does not in terms shift the burden of proof
to the defendant, it has quite predictably 5 been construed to have no
"-See statutes cited notes 13 and 14 supra.
*227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947).
2

Scope of employment will hereafter be referred to as "scope.

'Note, 25 N.C.L. REv. 491 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).

' Interpretative difficulties are inevitable whenever a statute uses the terms

"prima facie evidence," or "presumption," without further directive as to

what if any effect is intended to be had upon pleading burden, burden of
proof, and probative force by virtue of the operation of statutory prima facie
evidence or presumptions. There is no unanimity as to (1) the distinctions,
if any, between prima facie evidence and presumption as concepts; (2) their
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other effect than to provide immunity against a motion to nonsuit"
at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence." It does not have the effect
of shifting to defendant any more than the administrative burden
of going forward with the evidence.' Upon the offering of uncontradicted evidence which, directly opposes the inferred facts of agency
and scope, the defendant is entitled to a peremptory instruction s in
effect upon the burden of proof when only these terms are used; (3) what
probative force, if any, is created thereby for jury consideration. See generally Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. Rxv. 391 (1956); McBaine,
Burden of Proof: Presumptions,2 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 13 (1954).
On the first point, Wigmore criticizes the widespread synonymous usage
of the terms prima facie evidence and presumption in the interest of accurate
terminology and clear doctrinal analysis. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §'2494 (3d
ed. 1940). The North Carolina court has equated "presumption of fact"
with prima facie evidence, both as to constituent elements and as to consequences. See, e.g., In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591, 27 S.E.2d 728 (1943).
But this court also recognizes and applies a "presumption of law," which has
different consequences in the material respects herein noted from the presumption of fact, or prima facie evidence. See, e.g., In re Will of Wall,
sup ra.
On the second and third points, two "schools" with powerful protagonists

have evolved. The Wigmore position, following Thayer, is that the burden

of proof in the ultimate sense "never shifts" by virtue of even a "true" presumption's operation. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2489 (3d ed. 1940). On the
other hand, Professor Morgan takes the position that a true presumption
should shift the risk of non-persuasion and require a meaningful instruction
to that effect to the jury. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 17-41
(1954). UNIFORM RULE OF EvIDENCE 14, reflecting influence from both
schools, announces a hybrid approach by which the ultimate burden shifts
only if the basic facts of the presumption "have any probative value as evidence of the presumed fact." The basic divergence is reflected among various courts. The North Carolina court, following its conceptual distinctions,
has traditionally held the "presumption of law" to effect a shift of the risk of
non-persuasion and require an instruction to that effect, but has denied these
consequences to the "presumption of fact." See generally Speas v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 188 N.C. 524, 125 S.E. 398 (1924); McCormick,
Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REv. 291, 295-97
(1927). Thus, judicial announcement in a North Carolina opinion of approval of a "presumptive rule" can be followed in the same opinion by a
rejection of a "presumptive rule" in favor of a "prima facie rule" with no
illogic if the first presumptive rule is understood to refer to a presumption
of fact and the second to a presumption of law. Unexplained, such a juxtaposition is ambiguous and misleading. See note 18 infra.
o Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
Although the statute has only the limited effect pointed out in text, it
must be kept in mind that prior to its passage plaintiffs on this proof in this
type of case had no chance of getting to the jury. See Carter v. Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc., 227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947) and text at note 1.
Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., No. 171, N.C. Sup. Ct., October 10,

1962.

'Travis v. Duckworth, 237 N.C. 471, 75 S.E.2d 309 (1953). "When all
the evidence offered suffices, if true, to establish the controverted fact, the

court may give a peremptory instruction-that is, if'the jury find the facts to

be as all the evidence tends to show, -it will answer the inquiry in an indi-

cated manner. Defendant's denial of an alleged fact raises an-issue as to its
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his favor as a matter of right? even absent any special request.' 0
, In a recent case' plaintiff, suing the owner of a tractor-trailer unit
for -damages for personal injuries sustained in a highway collision,
offered as sole proof of ownership, agency, and scope of employment,
identifying markings which suggested defendant's ownership. Held,
that this evidence constitutes prima facie proof of ownership, agency,
and scope, but does not shift to the defendant the burden of proof in
the ultimate sense of the risk of non-persuasion. 2
Since G.S. § 20-71.1 was not in play in this case because of failure
to comply with the then applicable one year provision," this decision,
expressly overruling Carter v. Thruston Motor Lines Inc., 14 makes

available a new method, independently of that statute,15 for supplying
existence even though he offers no evidence tending to contradict that offered
by plaintiff. A peremptory instruction does not deprive the jury of its right
to reject the evidence because of lack of faith in its credibility. [Citations
omitted.] Such an instruction differs from a directed verdict as that term
is used by us. A verdict may never be directed when the facts are in dispute.
The judge may direct a verdict only when the issue submitted presents a
question of law based upon admitted facts." Chisholm v. Hall, 255 N.C. 374,
376-77, 121 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1961). It might be considered that plaintiff
still has received substantial aid from the statute since defendant must produce evidence to justify the peremptory instruction, and since presumably the
plaintiff, though unprepared to meet it, is protected as to its truthfulness by
the sanction of perjury. This sanction may well be a weak reed considering
the frequently shadowy line between agency and bailment. See Travis v.
Duckworth, supra.
'Whiteside v. McCarson, 250 N.C. 673, 110 S.E.2d 295 (1959).
"0In further clarification of the statute's effect it was held to establish a
mere rule of evidence and not to eliminate the necessity of pleading both
agency and negligence. Hartley v. Smith, 239 N.C. 170, 79 S.E.2d 767
(1954).
" Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
The result reached in the principal case is in accord with the weight of
authority. E.g., Barber Pure Milk Co. v. Holmes, 264 Ala. 45, 84 So. 2d 345
(1955); Robinson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 Ill. App. 278 (1930). See
generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 167 (1952).
12 The trial judge, considering that Virginia law as to the burden of proof
applied in view of the Virginia locus of the collision, charged the jury, in
Eorrect -application of Virginia law, that the effect of this evidence was to
shift the burden of proof in the ultimate sense to the defendant. This was
held error for the lex fori rather than the lex loci applies to these "procedural
matters." The court then rejected the Virginia rule in favor of that pointed
out in text.
"' N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 494 removed by N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch.
975.
91'227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947).
" Presumably, in a similar case arising where G.S. § 20-71.1 (a) could
be invoked, a more or less academic question could be presented as to the
mechanics of operation of the rule of Knight within the framework of G.S.
§ 20-71.1 (a). That is, will evidence of identifying markings supply the proof
of ownership contemplated by G.S. § 20-71.1 (a) so as thereupon to invoke
the operation of that statute, to create a "prima facie case" by its very terms,

19621
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the hiatus in available proof of ownership, agency, and scope.16 -But
it was soon made clear that this method is to be of no greater service
to plaintiffs than are the inferences allowed by G.S. §20-71.1, as
construed. For, on new trial of the Knight" case, the trial court
was held to have committed error when it charged the jury in effect
that the prima facie rule announced on first appeal had the effect of
shifting the burden of proof in the ultimate sense to the defendant." s
It may well be that the legislature intended by G.S. § 20-71.1
to favor the plaintiff's over-all chances of success in this type case
in a more substantial way than merely to provide nonsuit immunity
or, will the rule of Knight continue to operate independently of that statute,
as it did in the Knight case? That this is a purely academic speculation is
indicated by the point, developed in text, that the prima facie rule of Knight
is perfectly corollary to the prima facie rule of the statute as interpreted.
"It is interesting to note although the statute does not go as far as the
court was asked to go in Thurston the court in Knight went beyond what
the statute provided by inferring agency and scope solely from identifying
markings without necessity of proof of ownership or registration. - Quaere whether the judicial extension of Knight raises a constitutional
question. If in a subsequent case the court determines that the judicial inference of Knight is in effect provided for in the statute such a decision.
might well run into the settled rule that in order for a statutory presumption
to be held valid there must be some "rational connection" between the fact
to the proof of which the presumption is attached and the ultimate fact to
be established. Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
The judicial extension moves proof of the necessary basic fact on which the
inferences are predicated one step further back from the critical fact of
agency. McCormick is of the opinion that statutory presumptions in regard
to civil cases will not be straight-jacketed to the extent that presumptions in
criminal cases are. MCCORM cK, EVIDENCE § 313 (1954).
17
Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., No. 171, N.C. Sup. Ct., October
10, 1962.
1
"Any confusion in the trial judge's instructions may fairly be traced to
some rather ambiguous language in the first Knight opinion in referring 'to
presumptions and prima facie cases: "In our opinion, the presumptive rule,
which is generally recognized throughout this country, is a just one, and
well-nigh necessary if those who happen to be injured by the negligent
operation of such equipment are to have the protection to which they are
justly entitled. Therefore, we hold that the evidence of the plaintiff in the
trial below was sufficient to make out a prima facie case, and the defendant's"
motion for judgment as of nonsuit was properly overruled. However, since
the court below used the Virginia presumptive rule in charging the jury, and
we now are adopting the prima facie rather than the presumptive rule, we
think the defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered." Knight
v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 467-68, 122 S.E.2d 64, 69 (1961).
When the court in the first Knight opinion distinguished between prima
facie cases and presumptions, it failed to make its further traditional distinction between presumptions of law and of fact. See note 5 supra. Presumably, the court sought to distinguish the presumption of law, not the pyesumption of fact, from the prima facie case on the ground that the former
shifts the burden of proof in the ultimate sense. Failure to maintain and
reiterate this doctrinal analysis in which two kinds of presumptions are,
recognized can lead to the confusion indicated by the trial judge's instructions.
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If so,

experience has demonstrated that the only way to accomplish this
with certainty is by a statutory provision expressly placing upon the
defendant the burden of proof in the ultimate sense.19
Until such time as a change of this type is made plaintiffs' counsel must realize that exclusive reliance on either the inference created
by the present statute or the judicial inference adopted in the Knight
case is apt to lead into a trap. The total effect of either inference is
merely to take the plaintiff past a possible nonsuit at which point it
vanishes leaving him naked in respect of evidence to substantiate his
claim and open to an adverse verdict via a peremptory instruction in
favor of the defendant.
The best weapons with which a plaintiff's attorney can arm himself to combat the problem of adducing ultimately effective proof on
these frequently elusive elements are not the statutory inference nor
the judicial inference of Knight, but rather, extensive investigation
to discover more direct evidence of the ultimate facts of agency and
scope, pleadings 20 designed to force admissions of both agency and
9
Massachusetts has a statute which in terms goes beyond the mere creation of a prima facie or presumptive rule to specify that the result of the
prima facie case of agency and scope made out shall be to shift the burden
to the defendant as an affirmative defense. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85A
(1956). If a policy decision is made that more drastic leverage should be
given plaintiffs in respect of their ability to adduce ultimately effective proof
on these elements, this type statute must be used to insure the critical aspect
of shifting of burden of proof.
2 Good technical drafting and the code itself require that allegations of
each material fact be separately stated. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-122 (1953).
This may frequently force admission of the critical facts of agency and possibly scope, whereas if the same allegations are lumped in with other allegations, a defendant may frequently, by use of a negative pregnant form of
denial, avoid admission with impunity.
The principal case would appear to furnish a rather good example of
pleading in a manner which increases the probability of the defendant's use
of a negative pregnant form of denial which, if unchallenged, successfully
avoids having to deny directly under verification the narrow facts of ownership and agency. In a single paragraph the complaint alleged ownership,
agency and scope and all the facts leading up to the accident. The corresponding paragraph in the answer reads: "The defendant denies that a tractor-trailer unit, owned by it and being driven by one of its employees in the
course of his employment in a southerly direction on U.S. Highway #306,
negligently and carelessly crossed the center line of said highway and struck
the left fender of the tractor-trailer unit in which the plaintiff was riding
and continued to strike the left side of the tractor and trailer, thereby knocking the plaintiff violently about the cab of said tractor, resulting in serious
and painful injuries to the plaintiff, or that a vehicle of the defendant collided in any way with the truck in which the plaintiff was a passenger; that
as to the other allegations of paragraph III of the complaint, this defendant
has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
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scope, and extensive use of the available discovery procedures." In
view of the fact that in some instances even the combination of extensive investigation and artfully drawn pleadings and discovery procedures may not supply the ultimately effective proof of these
elements, a statute expressly shifting the burden of proof to defendant
may be required.
MACK B. PEARSALL
Federal Income Taxation-Alimony and Support Payments-Effect
of Contingent Reduction Provisions in Property Settlements
The 1961 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Lester' provides for simplicity of interpretation and
certainty of tax consequences where property settlement agreements

incident to divorce or separation are subject to contingent alteration.
Prior to 1942, a taxpayer who was divorced or legally separated
from his wife was generally not entitled to deduct alimony from
gross income.' The Revenue Act of 1942' changed this by requiring
a wife4 to include in gross income "periodic" payments received from
her husband made in discharge of a marital duty.5 A complimentary
or falsity of the same, and the same are therefore denied." Record, p. 4,
Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
Conceivably, if the plaintiff had alleged ownership, agency, and scope in
separate paragraphs an admission of one or more then might have been

forced.
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-568.1-.27 (1953).
1366 U.S. 299 (1961), affirming 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960), reversing
32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
1 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8 (1935); Gould v.Gould, 245 U.S.
151, 153 (1917). Alimony was deductible from gross income when the
divorce decree, settlement agreement, and state law operated as a complete
discharge of liability for support. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149, 156
(1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1939).
S56 Stat. 798 (1942).
'For purposes of simplicity it is assumed the husband is paying alimony
or support; however, the statute covers a situation in which a wife is required to pay alimony to the husband. Elinor Stewart Sokol, 7 T.C. 567
(1946); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §3797(a)(17) (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 7701 (a)(17)).
5
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71), provided "periodic payments .. . received . . . in discharge of . . . a legal obligation which, because of the
marital or family relationship, isimposed upon or incurred by such husband
under ... a written instrument ... shall be includible in the gross income
of such wife .... This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such
periodic payment which the terms of the... written instrument fix, interms
of... a portion of the payment, as a sum which ispayable for the support
of minor children of such husband."

